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Abstract 
 
 
Jonathan Lear argues that the established purgation, purification, and cognitive 
stimulation interpretations of Aristotle’s concepts of catharsis and tragic pleasure are 
off the mark.  In response, Lear defends an anti-cognitivist account, arguing that it 
is the pleasure associated with imaginatively “living life to the full” and yet hazarding 
nothing of importance that captures Aristotle’s understanding of catharsis and tragic 
pleasure.  This analysis reveals that Aristotle’s account of imagination in conjunction 
with his understanding of both specific intellectual virtues and rational emotions of 
an educated citizen not only tells against Lear’s anti-cognitivist construal, but also 
divulges an alternative cognitive stimulation reading. 
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I. Introduction 
 
At Poetics I.6, 1449b25-29, Aristotle articulates the definition of the essence of 
tragedy that includes its function.1  He states: 
 
Tragedy, then, is an imitation [μίμησις] of serious and complete action, which 
possesses magnitude, by being pleasurably embellished through speech with 
each of the forms separately [employed] in the parts, [through] acting and not 
through a narrative, by bringing to fruition through pity and fear the catharsis 
[κάθαρσιν] of such kinds of emotions.2 
                                                          
* Department of Philosophy, Indiana University South Bend, South Bend, Indiana, USA.  
E-mail: mananth@iusb.edu 
2                              International Journal of Art and Art History, Vol. 2(2), December 2014  
 
 
 
Then, Aristotle proceeds to sharpen his point about catharsis in terms of the 
pleasure qua tragic pleasure that ought to be elicited from the audience: 
 
And the [poet], who produces not the fearful [effect] through spectacle but 
only the startling-sensationalism [effect], shares nothing in common with 
tragedy; for it is not necessary to seek every pleasure by means of tragedy but 
[to seek] the appropriate kind [of pleasure]. And since it is necessary for the 
poet to produce the pleasure from pity and fear through imitation, it is clear 
that this [kind of tragic pleasure] must be created within the circumstances [of 
a tragedy].3  
 
Closely related to the above quotations, Aristotle goes on to describe in which 
contexts and circumstances pity and fear should be presented: 
 
And whenever misfortunes have occurred among family relationships, for 
example either [between] brother [and] brother or son [and] father or mother 
[and] son or son [and] mother, either when one kills [a person] or when one is 
about to do a thing of such a kind to another [person], one must seek out 
these [things].4  
 
It is evident from the first of the above passages that the ability to effect a 
“catharsis” in the individuals of an audience is one of the crucial requirements of a 
well-constructed tragedy, according to Aristotle.  Moreover, the second passage makes 
clear that the cathartic effect of a tragedy will produce an “appropriate pleasure” of a 
certain kind.  Lastly, the third passage above indicates that the appropriate method of 
bringing about the emotions of pity and fear (and the corresponding kind of “tragic 
pleasure”) is through a certain depiction of the relationships between friends and 
relatives.  Unfortunately, the remains of Aristotle’s Poetics (or any of his other works) 
reveal no thorough account of his concept of catharsis.  This dearth of details has 
resulted in a plethora of interpretations of Aristotle’s concept of catharsis.   Today, 
three broad interpretations of these different versions of tragic catharsis have emerged 
from the research.5  Tragic catharsis has been interpreted as a process of either (or 
some combination of) (1) purgation, (2) purification, or (3) cognitive stimulation. 
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II.  Three Interpretations of Catharsis and Tragic Pleasure  
 
On the purgation view of tragic catharsis, observing a tragedy can assist in 
removing unhealthy emotions or pathological conditions.  Specifically, it is the 
emotions of pity and fear that are purged.  By way of the medical-homeopathic 
analogy, pity and fear are used to remove pity-and-fear-type emotions and related 
pathological states in much the same way that illness-causing agents can be removed 
from a physically ill person by micro-doses of the same illness-causing agents.  From 
this perspective, scholars argue that Aristotle held the view that tragic catharsis is the 
removal of unhealthy emotional and pathological states and tragic pleasure is the 
psychological relief or renewal brought about by the removal of such emotions.6  
Meager promotes the purgation reading of catharsis and tragic pleasure since he 
thinks that Aristotle’s view about the imitation of action “must move us, deeply and 
consciously, to an intensity of pity and fear which mounts to an emotional climax in 
us, permitting a sudden and controlled release from tension and restoration of a state 
of emotional freshness and readiness.”7   
 
In contrast to the purgation account, some scholars insist on a purification 
interpretation.   According to this reading, tragic catharsis is the cleansing of the 
emotions of pity and fear such that the emotions of pity and fear are modified.  Tragic 
pleasure, then, is the enjoyment of the cleansed emotions of pity and fear.   So, when 
the audience comes to understand the honest mistakes made by Oedipus, the 
audience expresses both pity and fear in the right way and toward the appropriate set 
of circumstances.  In this way, the confusion and pain that frequently accompany pity 
and fear are cleansed away by the focus of those emotions on a fully comprehensible 
set of tragic events (e.g., Oedipus).  Butcher states the purification view (as a response 
to the purgation interpretation) by noting that tragedy provides “an outlet for pity and 
fear, but to provide for them a distinctively aesthetic satisfaction, to purify and clarify 
them by passing them through the medium of art.”8 
 
Distinct from both the purgation and purification renderings is the cognitive 
stimulation /clarification interpretation of catharsis and tragic pleasure.  According to 
this approach, Aristotle takes the cathartic experience to be that of improved 
understanding of the details of both a particular plot and the actions of the actors.  
Additionally, the universal aspects of the human condition are better understood by 
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the unfolding of the pitiable and fearful events of a tragedy.  Golden stands as one of 
the prominent defenders of this construal.  He thinks that catharsis and tragic 
pleasure are best understood in terms of inferences made by the observer of a tragedy.  
Such inferences reflect cognitive clarification in the sense that they provide a better 
understanding “of the individual act by providing, through the medium of art, the 
means of ascending from the particular event witnessed to an understanding of its 
universal nature, and thus permits us to understand the individual act more clearly and 
distinctly.”9  On this cognitive stimulation/clarification reading, then, catharsis is the 
process by which observers of a tragedy are better able to realize the nature of 
particular actions of a protagonist and human actions more generally.  Tragic pleasure, 
moreover, is the accompanying cognitive pleasure of this better understanding, which 
is illuminated by pitiable and fearful events.10 
 
III.  Lear’s Challenge 
 
In a number of places, Jonathan Lear has argued that none of the above 
interpretations can be defended on the basis of Aristotle’s corpus.11  This essay, in 
part, will focus on Lear’s rejection of catharsis as a process of (3) cognitive 
stimulation.  Basically, Lear provides what he calls an “anticognitivist” interpretation 
of catharsis, an interpretation which he considers to approximate most closely what 
Aristotle’s own account would have been.  Lear’s view is summed up in the following 
two passages: 
 
1. For an anticognitivist like myself does not believe that there is no role for 
cognition and its attendant pleasure in the appreciation of a tragedy; he only 
denies that cognitive pleasure is to be identified with tragic pleasure.  For the 
anticognitivist, cognitive pleasure is a step that occurs en route to the 
production of the proper pleasure of tragedy.12  
 
2. Tragic poetry provides an arena in which one can imaginatively experience the 
tragic emotions:  the performance of a play “captures our souls.”  However, it 
is crucial to the pleasure we derive from tragedy, that we never lose sight of 
the fact that we are an audience, enjoying a work of art.  Otherwise the 
pleasurable katharsis of pity and fear would collapse into merely painful 
experience of those emotions.  Aristotle is keenly aware of the important 
difference between a mimesis of a serious action and the serious action of 
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which it is a mimesis.  The emotional response which is appropriate to a 
mimesis—tragic pleasure and katharsis—would be thoroughly inappropriate to 
the real event.13 
 
Lear stresses that the cognitive element and its associated pleasure in a 
cathartic experience are merely “causal antecedents of the proper effect and proper 
pleasure of tragedy.”14  According to Lear, the proper pleasure of tragedy is the joy we 
experience when “[w]e imaginatively live life to the full, but we risk nothing.”15   
 
In response, this essay reveals that Lear’s thesis can be weakened to the extent 
that it is reasonable to think that Aristotle thought that tragic catharsis is associated 
with the pleasure of judging fairly and sympathetically the actions of the characters in 
a tragedy.  Additionally, given Lear’s use of imagination, this essay will also reveal that, 
for Aristotle, the imaginative faculty has a cognitive dimension that is constitutive of 
various sorts of pleasure, including tragic pleasure.  If correct, then this cognitive 
aspect of the imaginative faculty further casts doubt on Lear’s account of how 
Aristotle likely understood catharsis and tragic pleasure.  If this overall positive 
account is reasonable, then locating Aristotle within the cognitivist camp is also 
reasonable.  
 
IV.   Citizenship and Judgment: Catharsis and Tragic Pleasure 
 
The positive account to be proposed provides a credible interpretation of 
catharsis that will reveal the implausibility both of Lear’s two points and of his anti-
cognitivist account of catharsis in general.   Even granting Lear his strategy of using 
the Politics as a means of understanding tragic catharsis in the Poetics, the positive 
account to follow will still undermine his argument.  By synthesizing aspects of 
Aristotle’s Politics, Poetics, Nicomachean Ethics, De Anima, Rhetoric, and Sophocles’s 
Oedipus the King, a plausible approximation of Aristotle’s response to the challenge 
presented by Plato can be put forth.16    
 
To begin, it is important to introduce a distinction that has been often 
neglected in the current literature on catharsis:  the distinction between the kind of 
cathartic experience that the citizenry of the polis has and the kind of cathartic 
experience restricted to all other denizens.  The Politics alludes to just this division in 
which Aristotle discusses the role attributed to music: 
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[It is necessary] for everyone that a certain catharsis [τινα κάθαρσιν] is brought 
about and [it is necessary for everyone] to be satisfied in the midst of pleasure.  
And similarly, the effective melodies also render a harmless gratification to 
humans.17 
 
On which account, the participants, when they perform theatrical music, 
should be permitted to use harmonies of these kinds and melodies of these 
kinds; but since the spectator is two-fold: one group is free and has been 
educated, while the other group is vulgar and is grouped together from 
workings and hired laborings and other things of such kinds, one must 
provide contests and spectacles and things of these kinds with a view to 
relaxation…and what is suitable according to nature provides pleasure for 
each.18 
 
These passages from Aristotle reveal the following argument he is making 
with regard to class and catharsis.  Basically, within the context of his best or ideal 
city-state, he is claiming that the having of a cognitively based cathartic experience 
requires individuals who are naturally free (have leisure) and educated.  In contrast, 
the having of emotional excitation, or hedonistic frenzy alone, is relegated to 
individuals who are naturally vulgar and uneducated.  Therefore, since citizens have 
the requisite leisure and education and workers and slaves lack both, citizens of the 
polis naturally do have cognitively based cathartic experiences, and workers and slaves 
naturally only have emotional or hedonistic cathartic experiences.19  The purpose of 
laying out this argument is to impress upon the reader Aristotle’s own division 
between the kinds of aesthetic experience had by non-citizens and citizens.   This 
distinction will prove most valuable as my argument unfolds.  
 
That a tragedy even more than music is included in the above argument will 
now be examined.  The discussion can commence with Aristotle’s account of a 
properly formed plot in a tragedy.  The plot and representation of character are the 
most important aspects of an Aristotelian tragedy (although the rest are necessary to 
achieve the full theatrical effect) because of their connection with action.  It is action 
(within the construction of the story), which establishes the character of the 
protagonist, that the audience is being asked to judge.  The point about judgment is 
clear in the Politics, where Aristotle emphasizes the importance of “judging correctly 
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and rejoicing [τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν] at reasonable dispositions and noble 
actions.”20  This emphasis on action, moreover, is clearly articulated in the Poetics:  
 
For tragedy is an imitation not about people but about actions and life, and 
both happiness and unhappiness are in action, and the end is a certain kind of 
action, not a quality.  And it is according to character that people have certain 
qualities, but they are happy or the opposite according to their actions.   
 
Therefore, they [i.e., the poets] do not act in so far as to represent character, 
but they include character for the sake of actions; consequently, the events 
and the plot are the goal of a tragedy, and the goal is the most important of all 
[the elements of a tragedy].21 
 
Aristotle does not mean just any type of action, however, in his discussion of 
tragedy.  He is referring to a change from happiness to misfortune that is the result of 
a mistake [ἁμαρτία] made by a person of good character (e.g., Oedipus).22  This 
distinction between action and tragic action is crucial to Aristotle’s system.  One kind 
of action that he does not allow in a tragedy is that of base or guilty people whose 
actions are intentionally criminal.  These people, due to their baseness, do not warrant 
our pity when bad things happen to them.  Aristotle also does not allow the depiction 
of fortunate events that befall virtuous people, because there is no choice made by 
these virtuous people that can be judged in such circumstances.  Rather, he includes 
the representation of the unfortunate actions of virtuous people whose actions are 
based on their deliberative choices [προαίρεσεις].23 
 
It is the deliberative choices of people in a tragedy, then, that the audience 
judges.  In order to understand to what this kind of judging amounts, it will be 
necessary to explicate Aristotle’s two practical virtues concerned with conduct in 
Nicomachean Ethics, VI.9-11, and then turn to how they relate to the specifics of 
tragedy.  The two practical intellectual virtues that are to be distinguished here are 
σύνεσις and γνώμη.  To capture fully the sense of these terms, they will also be 
distinguished as subordinate virtues in relation to the superlative practical virtue of 
practical wisdom [φρόνησις].24  
 
According to Aristotle, an individual who acquires practical wisdom has the 
ability to judge and determine correctly the truth or falsity of moral judgments (his 
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own moral judgments as well as others).  Further, this morally insightful man has the 
unique characteristic of never erring in such judgments.  It is the combination of these 
two characteristics that reveals why Aristotle understands a man who has acquired the 
rather elusive intellectual virtue of practical wisdom to be a rather exceptional person.  
Thus, Aristotle expresses the possession of practical wisdom as “the state of the soul 
by which we always grasp the truth and never make mistakes, about what can or 
cannot be otherwise.”25  By taking all of this together, it is should be clear why most 
scholars correctly understand φρόνησις as practical wisdom.  
 
As Louden stresses, both σύνεσις and γνώμη are subordinate virtues with 
respect to practical wisdom.26  That is, a man who possesses practical wisdom is 
definitely in possession of its subordinate virtues (i.e., σύνεσις and γνώμη), but it is also 
possible for a man to be in possession of one or both of the subordinate virtues and 
still not acquire practical wisdom.  The justification is that, because it is a prescriptive 
virtue that enables us to know what to do, practical wisdom is concerned with both 
universals and particulars.27  Σύνεσις and γνώμη, while concerned with critically 
judging actions and character, are restricted only to judging [κριτική μονον] and 
grasping particulars.28      
 
Keeping these intellectual virtues in mind, the ability to reflect critically and 
judge the mistakes of others within the context of a tragic plot is the primary issue at 
hand here.  For Aristotle, the honest mistake would be the only kind of action that 
would effectively produce pity and fear, because the actions of a corrupt person 
would shock us rather than move us in the direction of pity and fear.  Similarly, the 
good fortune of accidental events of the virtuous man’s actions is not convincing but 
absurd because it is not in conformity with necessity or probability.  Ἁμαρτία is to be 
understood, then, as an error or mistake made by a protagonist in a tragedy due to his 
ignorance of particulars.29  This definition of error in tragic plots is categorically 
concluded by Aristotle in the Poetics: 
 
Consequently, it is necessary for the plot that is well-made to be single rather 
than double, as some say, and change [occurs] not from misfortune into good 
fortune, but the opposite: from good fortune into bad fortune, not through 
wickedness, but through a great error [ἁμαρτίαν μεγάλην] either just like I 
have stated or better rather than worse.30 
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Further, both reversal [περιπέτεια] and recognition [ἀναγνώρισις] as elements 
of a well-constructed plot aid in amplifying the probability and/or necessity of such 
honest mistakes—the former by exemplifying the antithesis of the expected results of 
particular actions (i.e., unintended consequences), and the latter by bringing about a 
state of knowledge from a state of ignorance.  According to Aristotle, the best plot 
will have recognition and reversal occurring simultaneously, as in Oedipus The King.31  
The cathartic experience, then, will reach its apex when this marriage between reversal 
and recognition occurs because both pity and fear will accompany these elements of 
the tragedy.  
  
Here we see a very powerful strategy employed by Aristotle in his attempt to 
produce the emotions of pity and fear in the audience, emotions that will aid in their 
ability to adjudicate equitably the character of the protagonist.  For example, when a 
messenger arrives to tell King Oedipus that his father in Corinth has recently died 
from natural causes, there is a tremendous feeling of relief on the part of Oedipus 
(and the audience) that he was not the cause of his father’s death as the prophecy 
warned.  Unfortunately, two other messengers arrive to reveal that the King in 
Corinth was not Oedipus’s real father and that he had been delivered to the King of 
Corinth at his birth.  Oedipus’s reaction is that of horror and stupefaction.  This 
reversal of events, along with the amazement expressed by the two messengers who 
recognize each other after many years, provide the missing information that reveals 
the error in Oedipus’s actions.  
 
As noted earlier, Aristotle places such a strong emphasis on this definition of 
a mistake within the context of a complex plot because he does not wish it to be 
confused with deliberate wrong-doing.  For example, Oedipus’s accidental killing of 
his father and subsequent marriage to his mother represent the kind of non-
deliberative mistake that Aristotle is stressing.  The issue is that Aristotle is concerned 
with the difficulties that arise out of complex interactions between a person of good 
character and other friends and family in his environment.  Since an individual’s 
character is best analyzed by those closest to him, it is crucial for friends and family to 
cultivate and employ the skills of ethical judgment.        
 
Aristotle’s point is that the cathartic experience is not merely the result of 
treating a tragedy as a didactic exercise upon which one reflects in isolation, but must 
be an activity that includes close friends and family.32  Friendship and filial relations 
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provide the kind of interaction appropriate for improving one’s character, as noted 
above.  Observing a tragedy is an activity that allows friendship among family and 
neighbors to “become better as they are active together and correct one another:  
from the mold of each he takes the imprint of the traits he likes, whence the saying:  
‘Noble things from noble people’.”33 
 
Oedipus the King is the appropriate exemplar of the above discussion.  Oedipus 
is a man of good character and virtue but is still the victim of terrible circumstances 
that are beyond the deliberative choices he makes.  True friendship (which is an 
important element of one’s moral character) is the ability tactfully to see past such 
misfortunes or mistakes and assess the correct character of one’s friend in the light of 
how he has deliberated on his actions.34  Aristotle’s discussion of the requirements for 
tragic character in the Poetics and character in the NE specifies the relationship 
between an individual’s character and his actions, speech, and decisions: 
 
And [tragedy] will have character if, just as we said, the speech or the action 
makes apparent a deliberate choice of whatever sort; [and it will have] upright 
[character], if [it makes apparent] an upright [deliberate choice].35 
 
Indeed, since we wish for the end, and because we also wish and deliberately 
choose things with a view to the end, the actions concerning these things 
would be according to deliberate choice and voluntary. And the activities of  
the virtues are concerned with these things.  Indeed, virtue is also up to us, 
and similarly also vice.36 
 
The above quotations reveal that the actions and words of individuals 
generally, as well as in a tragedy, divulge their decisions and character.  But how does 
this relationship between actions and character relate to catharsis and cognition?  
Keeping in mind the earlier discussion of Aristotle’s intellectual virtues, a turn to what 
can be considered a strong connection between catharsis and cognitive stimulation is 
in order. 
 
It is this ability to judge fairly and equitably [γνώμη] with an empathetic heart 
[συγγνώμη] that captures the pleasurable activities of the educated citizens when they 
observe a tragedy in Aristotle’s system, or so it shall be argued.  To elaborate, the 
cathartic experience (that is the representations) produces the feelings of pity and fear 
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which concomitantly evoke emotions of sympathy from the audience (with regard to 
the actions of the protagonist) and feelings of dread that such errors could 
conceivably be committed by themselves.  Only the citizens of the polis have the 
virtues of σύνεσις and γνώμη to evaluate critically and correctly actions of the 
protagonist and focus appropriate attention on his intentions in relation to the given 
circumstances after the initial emotions of pity and fear are experienced.  Reasonably, 
in contrast to Lear’s position, the proper effect of a cathartic experience via tragedy 
can be the cognitive pleasures produced from the activities of judging equitably and 
empathetically.        
 
A final look at Sophocles’s Oedipus the King may help to synthesize what can be 
considered to be Aristotle’s approach to the cathartic experience.  The story begins 
with Oedipus hastily deciding to leave his parents in Corinth due to the prophecy by 
Phoebus (that Oedipus would kill his father and sleep with his mother) that was 
prompted by a drunkard at a dinner party.  As the story unfolds, Oedipus establishes a 
new life as the King of Thebes only to find out that the woman he has married and 
who is the mother of his children, Jocasta, is also his mother who abandoned him as a 
baby.  To make matters worse, Oedipus discovers that one of the men whom he 
killed on the road during his initial departure from Corinth was his wife’s husband—
Oedipus’s real (biological) father!  As a result of these unbearable events Oedipus 
violently blinds himself.   
 
The citizens of the polis, it has been argued, not only have the ability to 
understand or comprehend [σύνεσις] the circumstances surrounding the events of 
Oedipus the King, but they also have the good sense to judge Oedipus fairly/equitably 
[γνώμη] as opposed to strictly.37  That is, Oedipus may be persecuted or ostracized for 
the killing of the men during his flight from Corinth (admittedly, Oedipus was 
defending himself, but it is possible that he could have “negotiated” a less violent 
means of resolving the conflict), but he would not be condemned for patricide or 
incest because those actions were based on a mistake or error.  Oedipus’s character 
can, for the most part, be judged based on actions that were the result of deliberate 
choice.38  The audience is moved to this decision because the cathartic effect, which is 
achieved through pity and fear, produces such a response.      
 
From this perspective, only some citizens of the polis, for example, have the 
leisure, education, and the natural ability to understand [σύνεσις] and pass good/fair 
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judgments [γνώμη] on the errors (ignorance of particulars) made by the characters in 
tragic plays.  Most importantly, citizens are also able to connect relationships of 
various actions, which can have an impact on anyone anywhere (universals) “in 
accordance with probability and necessity.”39  The ability to make such connections is 
the extended cognitive stimulation that reversal, recognition, and suffering, which 
contain pity and fear, can produce in some of the citizenry who have these mental 
aptitudes and moral virtues. 
 
The workers and slaves, conversely, do not have the education, leisure 
(freedom), or the mental faculties to recognize moral virtue.  Thus, they are unable to 
make equitable judgments regarding which actions determine or do not determine an 
individual’s character.  As noted earlier, the result is that they are restricted to musical 
contests, the initial emotional jolt of a tragic play, or the impulsive frenzy of a 
religious ritual.  Again, the Politics reveals just this special distinction between liberated 
citizens and all others in the polis: “a virtue that belongs to a citizen must not be 
spoken of all (citizens), and not even of a free citizen only, but (only) to as many as 
those who are liberated from necessary working-occupations that are difficult.”40 
 
In summary, although the impact of tragedy (or art in general) would vary 
from the citizenry to all others within the polis, everyone receives some level of 
satisfaction and/or intellectual stimulation.  Both non-citizens and citizens, on the 
one hand, are entertained and are able to relax from the rigors of daily life.  Only 
some citizens, on the other hand, have the individual satisfaction of attempting to 
resolve difficulties that are outside the scope (an adjournment) of everyday problem 
solving, but that can be the foundation of daily interaction. 
 
V.   Catharsis and Tragic Pleasure in the Light of Imagination 
 
If this version of how Aristotle understood the cathartic experience is correct, 
then it tells against Lear’s view on how to understand Aristotle as a respondent to 
Plato.  First, if the peculiar pleasure of catharsis (for citizens of the polis) involves the 
intellectual virtues of comprehension [σύνεσις] and empathetic judgment [συγγνώμη], 
then such an experience is deeply tied to the rational part of the soul.  The 
consequence is that Aristotle can now be viewed to be providing a reply to Plato that 
poetry can enhance the rational part of the soul through the skills of comprehending 
and judging empathetically.  Therefore, if this interpretation is a reasonable 
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approximation of Aristotle’s account of catharsis, then Lear’s belief that Aristotle 
defended the idea that the cathartic experience is neutral with respect to its influence 
on the rational part of the soul is mistaken. 
 
Furthermore, Lear’s claim that the cognitive element is nothing more than a 
precondition of tragic pleasure is also open to objection.  There are two ways to 
respond to this claim.  First, if the positive account of the cathartic experience in the 
previous section is correct, then the pleasure that attends judging empathetically is a 
rational pleasure.  As a result, the cognitive element of the cathartic experience is no 
longer a causal antecedent to the proper pleasure of poetry (as Lear thinks), but is 
constitutive of the pleasure that attends the cathartic experience. 
 
Lear could reply, however, that this analysis ignores the imaginative element 
[ϕαντασία] that is a needed part of Aristotle’s account of catharsis.  Recall, Lear thinks 
that an integral part of the cathartic experience is that “[w]e imaginatively live life to 
the full, but we risk nothing.”  The assumption of this kind of response, of course, is 
that the psychology of imagining, for Aristotle, is necessarily minimally cognitive and 
harmless with respect to the soul. Yet, Baxter correctly points out that Lear’s analysis 
depends “crucially on an appeal to ‘imagination’.”  Moreover, hinting that Lear has 
not explored the details of such an appeal, Baxter stresses that “more work needs to 
be done to illuminate the connection between mimesis and imagination.”41  This 
section and the next forge just such a connection suggested by Baxter.    
 
The problem with Lear’s use of imagination is two-fold.  First, Aristotle’s 
account, as interpreted by Lear, would fail to meet Plato’s objection.  Plato would 
reply that Lear’s notion of imagining a sensible object is the production of a 
representation that is thrice removed from The Forms.  Lear’s account could not be 
utilized in this way by Aristotle to explain the cathartic experience.  Plato would have 
rejected it straightaway because of its soul-harming effects.  
 
Second, it is not at all clear that Lear is entitled to offer the above objection, 
because it is not clear that Aristotle recognizes the sense of imagination that Lear 
uses.   To see this, a review of Aristotle’s account of the faculty of imagination, that is 
ϕαντασιά, is in order.  After making clear that his predecessors accounts of the soul 
are wanting due (in part) to their inability to allow for the failure of the content of 
mental states to correspond with the way the world is (i.e., “mental error”), Aristotle 
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introduces imagination to fill the lacuna.42 Furthermore, before offering his 
considered view on the nature of imagination, Aristotle makes clear that, even 
granting that the faculty of imagination is related to either perception or reason, it is 
not identical to (1) sensation (perception), (2) conception, (3) knowledge, (4) belief, 
and (5) a combination of belief and sensation.  The implication is that the faculty of 
imagination is (in some sense) a distinct mental faculty. 
 
Aristotle begins his account of imagination by suggesting how it is related to 
sensation.  He then proceeds to locate where imagination does not admit of error and 
where it does admit of error. Additionally, he turns to differentiate senses of 
imagination with respect to humans and all other animals, making clear that animals 
do not possess rational [λογιστικὴ] imagination, but only possess perceptual 
[αἰσθητικὴ] imagination.43  Given the discussion at hand, how is rational imagination 
in humans to be understood? 
 
Scholars dispute how to make sense of Aristotle’s answer to the above 
question.  Some argue that rational imagination is nothing more than a necessary 
condition for reason qua calculation,44 while others insist that it can function much 
like reasoning.45  One way of understanding this debate is to determine where rational 
imagination should be located on the spectrum between perception and thinking; the 
former (at one extreme) being non/minimally cognitive and the latter (at the other 
extreme) being maximally cognitive:  
 
Sense Perception (non/minimally cognitive)…??«rational imagination»??…Thinking (maximally cognitive) 
 
To start, Aristotle categorically states that rational imagination is a faculty of 
discrimination: 
 
Now we see that the things which move the animal are intellect, imagination, 
purpose, wish, and appetite.  Now all these can be referred to mind and 
desire.  For imagination and sensation [ἡ ϕαντασιά καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις] cover the 
same ground as the mind, since they all exercise discrimination [κριτικὰ], 
though they differ in certain aspects as has been said elsewhere.46 
 
Aristotle makes clear in the above passage that the faculty of imagination 
engages in discrimination. Yet, in this context, discrimination ranges over both 
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imagination and sensation. This suggests that imagination takes on more of a 
minimally cognitive role much like the role perception plays in human and non-
human animals.  Still, Aristotle is quick to point out that they differ in certain ways.  
What this means is that, although both perception and imagination discriminate, they 
do not do so in precisely the same manner.  Can imagination perform in a more 
robust cognitive way in the case of humans? Well, to plumb a bit further, as part of 
his account of how movement occurs, at De Anima, 433b29-30, Aristotle notes (as 
mentioned above) that all imagination is related to either reason or sensation.  Very 
soon after this passage, at 434a7-8, he says that the calculating faculty of imagination 
is only found in those organisms that possess the reasoning ability.  Notice that, in his 
description of the calculating sense of imagination, Aristotle shifts from rational to 
deliberative in order to render a precise sense of rational; for he goes on to explain the 
deliberative sense of rational imagination as it relates to practical reasoning.  He tells 
us: 
 
So, perceptual imagination, just as it has been said, is present in other animals, 
but deliberative [βουλευτικὴ] imagination is in those animals that have the 
reasoning ability.  For whether this or that shall be enacted is already a result 
of the work of reason; and it is of necessity to measure in one way; for one 
seeks after the greater [of two options]; it follows that what acts in this way 
must be able to make a unity out of several images.47 
 
As is made clear in the above passage, the sense of rational imagination is 
deliberative imagination as it is tied to practical reasoning.  One reasons qua calculates 
about which option (amongst competing options) is best able to achieve a particular 
end. Yet, in order for the reasoning faculty to be able to do this, it must have a 
number of available options from which to choose.  Although the presence of these 
options is itself the work of imagination and reason, each option is a composite of x 
number of images.  The reasonable inference, then, is that deliberative imagination 
has the function of synthesizing together various images to create a composite image.   
 
Moreover, why is the presence of such options already a result of the work of 
reason?  Aristotle does not explicitly give an answer, but the reasonable one is that the 
ability to form a number of composite images, which reason uses as options in the 
light of the end under pursuit, is a rational activity.  Specifically, deliberative 
imagination “calls up” and forms the relevant images (from a range of many) in the 
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light of the end under consideration and then synthesizes the relevant images into 
image-options in a way that allows for reason to convert the image-options into the 
various means that will assist in the achievement of a particular end.48  Then, reason 
will calculate which option best assists in securing the target end.  Thus, deliberative 
imagination is a rational faculty in the sense that it (1) makes manifest a range of 
images with respect to the end being pursued and (2) synthesizes the relevant images 
into unified sets of image-options so that practical reason can perform its function. 
On this interpretation, then, deliberative imagination is both an image 
selector/producer and an image synthesizer. 
  
Now, recall that Aristotle also thinks of deliberative imagination as 
discriminating or discerning.  Not only is deliberative imagination able to discern in 
the fashion noted above, but it is also able to unify images concerning possible future 
events.  Aristotle makes this point within the context of practical reasoning: 
 
So the thinking faculty [τὸ νητικὸν] thinks the forms in the images 
[φαντάσμασι], and just as in those cases what was to be pursued and avoided is 
determined for it, so also beyond perception, whenever it is directed towards 
images, it is moved, as for example someone seeing a beacon sees that it is a 
fire, and seeing it moving knows that it is hostile; but sometimes also it 
reasons and deliberates [λογίζεται καὶ βούλευεται ] concerning what is going to 
happen by means of images or thoughts in the soul on the basis of what is 
present.49  
 
In part, the above account suggests that the ability to produce mental images 
about future events is the work of the thinking faculty by way of both images 
[φαντάσματα] and thoughts in the soul.  This can be interpreted in at least three ways.  
One, Aristotle is claiming that imagination by itself can produce mental images about 
the future for the thinking faculty, which then deliberates and calculates concerning 
such images.  Two, he could mean that imagination and thoughts can independently 
produce mental images for the thinking faculty.  Three, he could mean that the 
combination of images and thoughts produce mental images of future events upon 
which the thinking faculty can reflect.  
 
Although there is no knockdown evidence in favor of any of the above 
accounts, in his discussion of animal movement, Aristotle does hint at interpretation 
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one as follows: “that which moves would be one in form, that is the appetitive faculty 
qua appetitive, but the thing desired would be the first of all things (for this brings 
about movement without being moved through thinking or imagining [τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ 
φαντασθῆναι].50  Here, Aristotle explicitly acknowledges (by way of ‘or’) that 
imagination is able independently to access desired objects.  Smith translates this 
passage to include “being apprehended in thought or imagination.”51  Although 
‘apprehended’ is not explicitly stated by Aristotle, there is scope for this interpretation 
here.   
The crucial assumption here is that ‘apprehend’ must be interpreted as a 
capability both (1) to discriminate that an object is an object of a certain sort and (2) 
to construct a future image of said object.  We have already seen that (1) is clearly 
defended by Aristotle.  Interestingly, in his Rhetoric, Aristotle acknowledges (2).  
Within the context of distinguishing between fear and confidence, he says:  
 
Confidence is both the opposite with respect to fear, and [what brings about] 
confidence [is the opposite of what brings about] fear; thus it is in concert 
with the imaginative expectation [φαντασίας ἡ ἐλπὶς] of things that are safe 
[that they are also the things] that are nearby, while the things that are fearful 
either do not exist or are far off.52     
 
The passage makes clear that being confident is attached to expectation-
images associated with either those things that keep us safe or the remoteness of 
those things that would put us in harm’s way.  Clearly, to expect is to have future-
oriented images of close things that are good or distant things that are bad.  On this 
view, then, imagination can independently produce images of future images qua 
expectation-images.  Indeed, this is in keeping with Aristotle’s beacon of fire example 
noted above; that is, when one sees such a fire, one forms images of what one 
anticipates or expects will occur; for example, that one’s village will be burned to the 
ground or that one’s army has arrived.  Thus, it is reasonable to infer that imagination 
is able both (1) to discriminate that an object is an object of a certain sort and (2) to 
construct a future image of said object. 
 
If the above analysis is on the mark, there is no reason why deliberative 
imagination cannot independently apprehend and construct future object-images of 
the desired object.  For instance, not only does deliberative imagination apprehend 
that object X is a dessert, but it is able to construct the future image-object of the 
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observer enjoying the dessert at some future time T.  Thus, deliberative imagination 
can independently apprehend an object and can construct, for the thinking faculty, 
future object-images (this will require synthesis of images as well) of an apprehended 
object.         
 
In summary, deliberative imagination is a cognitive feature of the rational soul 
to the extent that it is able to (1) apprehend independently that an object is a certain 
kind of object, (2) construct future object-images, (3) select images, (4) produce 
images, and (5) synthesize images.  With these characteristics in place, it is clear that 
not only is deliberative imagination far removed from being minimally cognitive, but 
can be reasonably understood to be in the highly cognitive range (though not 
maximally cognitive). 
 
Still, Lear might contend that his analysis remains untouched by my 
interpretation.  He could very well grant this interpretation and claim that all the 
“intellectual stuff” that has been articulated is a mere antecedent to the actual pleasure 
of catharsis.  To elaborate, whenever someone offers a cognitive account of 
Aristotle’s concept of catharsis, Lear could always grant such an interpretation, but 
insist that it is merely a causal antecedent to the “real tragic pleasure” associated with 
catharsis.  Such a move, however, should be viewed with much suspicion, because 
such a reply would render Lear’s analysis unfalsifiable.  That is, no matter what 
cognitive account of catharsis is offered, Lear could always claim that such an account 
is a mere causal antecedent to the proper effect of tragedy.  Moreover, if it is the case 
that Lear’s use of imagination is inappropriate, then his use of it as part of his anti-
cognitivist account of the real tragic pleasure of catharsis is weakened as well.  Thus, it 
is reasonable to conclude that Lear’s account of Aristotle’s reply to Plato’s challenge is 
off the mark.   
 
Moreover, even if it is assumed that deliberative imagination is one of the 
linchpins to understanding the cathartic experience, it seems to run counter to Lear’s 
anti-cognitivist account.  Specifically, deliberative imagination, according to Aristotle, 
is a highly cognitive activity associated with both moral and non-moral actions.  It 
reasonably follows that its attending pleasures can be of a rational qua cognitive sort.  
This means that, for Lear, the tragic pleasure produced by catharsis would include (at 
least in part) cognitive pleasure—an implication that Lear would not wish to 
countenance.  Thus, it does not appear that Lear is in a position to employ, from an 
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anti-cognitivist perspective, Aristotle’s account of imagination in order to make sense 
of his concepts of catharsis and tragic pleasure.   
   
 
 
 
VI.   Imagination, Pity & Fear, and the Pleasure of Catharsis 
 
More must be said about imagination and its relationship to catharsis and 
tragic pleasure; for Lear is correct to mention imagination, but its exact role with 
respect to the observance of a tragedy must be made clear.  First, attention will be 
given to how imagination is related to comprehending and judging empathetically the 
actions of someone like Oedipus and how such comprehending and judging are 
related both to deliberative and perceptual imagination.  Second, the physical and 
cognitive dimensions of pity and fear will be explained.   
 
Recall that in order for the mind to reflect on the appropriate features of a 
particular image, deliberative imagination must conjure up the relevant image.  The 
nature of such images qua likenesses is explained by Aristotle as follows: 
 
For just as the animal drawn on a tablet is both an animal and a likeness, and 
this is both one and the same thing, the essence, however, is not the same for 
both, and it is possible to think [of the drawing] both as animal and as a 
likeness, and in this way it is also necessary to accept that the image in us [τὸ 
ἐν ἡμῖν φάντασμα] is itself essentially [καθ’ αὑτό] an object of contemplation 
and an image [φάντασμα] of something else.53      
 
In the same way that a drawing of an animal can be viewed both as an animal 
and as a likeness of an animal, the likeness of an animal in our minds is simultaneously 
both (1) a mere image of an animal that has the shape of an animal and (2) an image 
qua likeness (conjured up by deliberative imagination) upon which the thinking part of 
the soul reflects.  It is in this sense that the ontological status of the same mental 
image can be different.  In this way, the image of a gouge-eyed Oedipus is both the 
shape of a man and an image qua likeness of ill-fated Oedipus—an image that is 
stitched together by deliberative imagination.    
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In the Poetics (noted above), Aristotle states that non-philosophers and 
philosophers “take pleasure when they see likenesses, because while they observe they 
understand and reconcile [μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι] what each thing is: for 
instance, that this [person] is that [person].”54  However, he qualifies his claim about 
learning by noting that non-philosophers “partake of it to a lesser extent [ἐπὶ 
βραχὺ].”55   
Again, we see Aristotle making a distinction between different sorts of 
aesthetic experiences—in this case different degrees of cognitive pleasures—had by 
different members of the polis.  Non-philosophers have cognitive pleasures of 
likenesses to a far less degree than philosophers.  Yet, Aristotle’s educated citizen 
stands between these two extreme groups.  As I argued earlier, it is the pleasure that 
accompanies the joy in having judged finely that captures the cathartic experience for 
these educated citizens.  Thus, granting that the education of citizens will vary, it 
reasonably follows that the less educated citizen shares in this cognitive pleasure to a 
lesser extent than the more educated citizen and the more educated citizen shares this 
pleasure to a lesser extent than the highly educated philosopher.  For example, (1) 
responses by the less educated may be more visceral than cognitive, (2) the more 
educated could glean the pleasures of judging finely, and (3) the philosophically 
educated would be able to reflect on the metaphysical and ethical dimensions of the 
universality of poetic expression.  
 
Now, one may still be skeptical of my positive account of catharsis and 
imagination, even if Lear’s analysis is not satisfactory.  Specifically, one could reply 
that the positive account offered here over intellectualizes Aristotle’s sense of the 
cathartic experience. Even if one were to grant that there are different sorts of 
cathartic experiences amongst citizens and non-citizens, it does not follow that the 
cathartic experience of the citizenry is so closely tied to judging finely.  Such fine 
judgments may be both appropriate and required for the scientist and the 
philosopher, but seem out of place for the average citizen of the polis—even 
Aristotle’s ideal polis.   
 
In reply, Aristotle’s own assessment of the generally educated man of the polis  
clearly tells against this skeptical concern: 
 
There appears to be two ways of being in a certain state of understanding, of 
which one possesses what can rightly be called the scientific understanding of 
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the subject matter, and a certain kind [of understanding that can be called] the 
general-education understanding, concerning both every study and inquiry, 
and in a similar way for both more humble [studies and inquiries] and more 
honorable [studies and inquiries].  For it is in keeping with character of the 
educated man to be able to judge accurately what is fair or what is not fair in an 
explanation.  For, indeed, we also think that the generally educated man [τόν 
ὅλως πεπαιδευμένον] is this particular kind [of judging person], and [we think 
that] being educated is being able to do that which was said.56  
 
As Aristotle makes clear in the above passage, the generally educated person 
does engage in various degrees of intellectual activities, some of which include sorts of 
judging regarding what is fair and unfair.  Although such an educated citizen may not 
be able to engage in highly abstract or philosophical kinds of analysis, he can still 
engage everyday activities in a reflective and discriminating fashion.  Thus, the average 
educated citizen can reasonably have the sort of cathartic experience I have suggested.  
This can be seen by connecting rational imagination and catharsis to pity and fear. 
 
So, we can now ask: what about catharsis and tragic pleasure in terms of pity 
and fear?  A review of Aristotle’s account of pity and fear and how these are 
connected to the story of Oedipus should answer this question.  For assistance, 
Belfiore offers the following account of pity as it relates to Oedipus: 
 
Pity involves wailing and weeping…for pity, like fear, involves involuntary, 
painful physiological reactions (weeping) that are necessary in some way to the 
production of aesthetic pleasure… These reactions, however, are not 
involuntary and automatic…Pity, in Greek thought, is an essentially human 
emotion, dependent on an awareness of the common human lot…we often 
feel pity for people in completely hopeless situations… We weep while 
viewing Oedipus with his eyes put out because we see what appears to us to 
be a man in pain and weeping…Finally, because we shudder and weep at the 
tragedy qua people weeping, we realise that it is an imitation of a pitiable and 
fearful event: that this plot is an imitation of that event.57  
 
Belfiore notes both the physical and cognitive dimensions to pity with 
emphasis given to the context of observing a tragedy.  Basically, initial weeping of the 
depiction of a tragic event is a natural physiological response of pity.  Then, according 
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to Belfiore, the cognitive aspect to pity is that we are able to recognize that the 
unfolding plot is a copy qua imitation of a real human scenario that involves pitiable 
and fearful events. 
 
Moving beyond Belfiore, this response of pity becomes both emotionally and 
cognitively heightened (possibly to the extent of wailing) when one recognizes that 
near-inevitable events, like those that befall Oedipus, are part of the human condition.  
This human condition, moreover, is pitied to the extent that, not only do we feel 
badly for the protagonist’s plight, but we also understand that we could find ourselves 
in reasonably somewhat similar near-inextricable circumstances.58  Aristotle makes all 
of this explicitly clear: “People also pity those who are similar to them in terms of age, 
in terms of character, in terms habits, in terms of social position, [and] in terms of 
descent; for in all such [similarities] it appears more likely that [what happens to 
others] may also befall oneself.”59     
 
On this reading, the cognitive response to an Oedipus-type tale is more than 
the recognition that this plot is an imitation of that event.  Indeed, this understanding 
is extended to judgment, by way of σύνεσις and γνώμη, in the sense that educated 
citizens are able to judge empathetically and equitably Oedipus’ actions in the light of 
their own past similar experiences or that they could very well find themselves in 
similar circumstances—this Oedipus scenario is similar to that event that befell me 
and, moreover, this Oedipus scenario is a kind of unfortunate happenstance that could 
very well befall me. This is the cognitive pleasure achieved upon both the empathetic 
feeling of pity aroused by Oedipus’ plight and the corresponding empathetic and 
fairness judgments.  As defended earlier, we take joy in having judged finely.  It is at 
the empathetic judging stage, concomitantly with the recognition that one could be in 
similar circumstances as the protagonist in a tragedy, from which the heightened 
cognitive pleasure qua tragic pleasure emerges.60 
 
The other element of the cathartic experience is associated with fear.  Clearly, 
the spectacle of terror produces the physiological response of fear, which can have an 
accompanying feeling of fleeing the object of fear or a kind of almost dreadful-
paralysis.61  Aristotle explains the physiology of fear as follows: “Then let fear [be 
understood as] a certain suffering [λύπη τις] or commotion because of an image 
[ϕαντασιάς] of a looming wickedly destructive or sufferable event.”62 With respect to 
tragedy, the audience feels such pain or disturbance as they anticipate the unfolding of 
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a plot (in part by way of recognition and reversal discussed earlier), which includes 
both destructive and painful events that are imminent.  Oedipus’ patricide and incest, 
all of which culminates in the gouging of his eyes, bring to fruition the specific 
destructive and painful events that are broadly and fearfully anticipated (“I know 
something terrible is going to happen now…”) by the audience.  Aristotle hints at this 
kind of account, which includes judgment, emotions, and imagination, in De Anima:  
 
And, moreover, when we judge [δοξάσωμεν] that something is either fearful or 
threatening, we are at once affected by it, and similarly even when [we judge 
something to be] cheering; but in relation to imagination we are just like 
spectators [who are observing] fearful or cheering things in a painting.63    
     
Aristotle is clear that, upon judging that X is terrible or frightening, the 
relevant emotions (in this case fear) are produced.  Notice that causal priority is given 
to judgments over emotions.  From this perspective, emotions are distinct from 
visceral feeling responses or the initial “pain or disturbance” of threatening evil.  This 
suggests that, for Aristotle, emotions themselves are intertwined with cognitive 
meaning.  Interestingly, as part of his reply to Lear, Halliwell stresses the cognitive 
dimension of Aristotle’s account of emotions with respect to pity and fear (drawing 
on Poetics 4).64  To quote at length, here is his assessment:  
 
The complete experience of a tragedy will necessitate the understanding of the 
work’s significant structure of “actions(s) and life” (6.1450a16-17), the ethical 
characterizations of its agents, the rationale of their expressed thoughts, and 
so forth.  But this cannot be a coldly cerebral process of ratiocination; it is the 
necessarily evaluative engagement of the mind with imagined human actions and 
experiences of a deeply serious and, for Aristotle, a justifiably emotion-inducing 
kind.  It is for this reason that Aristotle speaks interchangeably of, on the one 
hand, the “pitiful” and “fearful” as properties of a tragic plot structure itself 
and its components (e.g., 9.1452a2-3), but also, on the other, of pity and fear 
as the appropriate response of the spectator (or reader) who attends to and is 
absorbed in this structure of events (e.g., 11. 1452a38-39)…So to suggest, as 
one scholar has, that the cognitive pleasure of tragedy “is a step that occurs en 
route to the production of the proper pleasure of tragedy,” where this 
pleasure is said to arise from pity and fear through mimesis, is to separate 
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elements that we should expect to find fused, given Aristotle’s view…that the 
emotions themselves are cognitively grounded.65 
 
Halliwell insightfully points out that (1) pity and fear are an integral part of 
Aristotle’s understanding of a well-crafted plot, (2) the response of pity and fear 
(through the help of imagination) on the part of the audience is appropriate because it 
aids in the audience’s ability to make reasonable normative/prescriptive claims 
regarding human actions and life in general, and (3) that it is a mistake to separate (as 
Lear does) the cognitive and emotional responses by the audience, since (for 
Aristotle) emotional responses are mediated by the faculty of reason.  As part of his 
reply to Lear’s claim that cognitive pleasure is a step in the direction of the proper 
pleasure of tragedy, Halliwell notes that such an account separates the cognitive and 
emotional aspects of the proper pleasure of tragedy when, in fact, these should be 
kept “fused.”66  Thus, taking (1)-(3) yields further support of the claim that emotions, 
for Aristotle, are intertwined with cognitive meaning.  The further upshot is that, 
contrary to Lear’s account, tragic pleasure is robustly cognitive.67     
 
In this same chapter, Halliwell offers his own account of how to make sense 
of Aristotle on tragic pleasure: “Such pleasure…is considered by Aristotle to arise 
from the exercise of our capacities for both understanding and emotion in the 
engagement with the fictive possibilities that art dramatizes.”68  He goes on: “In the 
case of tragedy, Aristotle’s whole theory suggests that an audience needs to have 
sufficient experience of life to understand various kinds of action, intention, and 
character; to be able to distinguish degrees of innocence, responsibility, and guilt; to 
know, in an effectively mature way, what merits pity and fear; to have a grasp of 
human successes and failures, of the relationship between status and character, and so 
forth.”  From all of this, Halliwell concludes that the “peculiar pleasure that tragedy 
affords will thus be of a compound kind (‘the pleasure from pity and fear through 
mimesis’).”69   
 
There is very little here with which I disagree.  Note that, with respect to my 
account, Halliwell’s analysis is restricted to the citizen class.  Within this class, he has 
captured very well the cognitive dimension of the educated citizen-audience and the 
kind of general tragic pleasure they will have.  My view is in keeping with his, although 
I give greater emphasis on judging character and the corresponding joy qua pleasure 
that comes from doing this well—all within the context of mimetic pity and fear.  My 
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only concern with Halliwell’s account is when he claims that tragedy provides the 
audience “with imaginative opportunities to rest, refine, extend, and perhaps even 
question the ideas and values on which such comprehension rests.”70  I would resist 
this reading, because it requires using both ‘comprehension’ and ‘imagination’ in ways 
that can be misleading.  Also, Halliwell does not pursue the role of imagination within 
this framework.  This is why I have offered an account of the role played by rational 
imagination in the cathartic experience.                 
 
Still, even granting my rational imagination account of catharsis and tragic 
pleasure, Aristotle appears to suggest (in the previous quotation above) that real-life 
emotions are not really present in the same manner as in the case of emotions 
associated with mental images; that is, the emotion-states that are produced by images 
and judgments are more akin to those emotions associated with observing art objects. 
For example, an image of a growling tiger does not produce the same emotional 
response as a living growling tiger a few feet away.  Aristotle must here mean that the 
intensity of emotion with respect to art objects is less than the intensity of emotions 
with respect to real-life frightful phenomena.  This interpretation is in keeping with 
his claims about what thinking and imagination can produce.  Aristotle says:      
 
And qualitative change is caused by imaginations and sense-perceptions and 
ideas.  For, on the one hand, sense-perceptions are at once a certain kind of 
qualitative change, while on the other hand, imagination and thinking have the 
effect of the objects [out in the world]; for in a way, the idea envisioned about 
[the warm or cold or] the delightful or fearful comes to be the same kind [of 
effect], much like [the effects] of what the objects [out in the world produce], 
and therefore [people] shudder and are frightened when they merely think [of 
scary things].71  
 
Aristotle clearly states that the combination of imagination and thinking has 
the power of actual things.  The subtle shift here to include thinking with imagination 
is important.  Although images of art objects have a far less intensity of emotion than 
real-life fearful things, the ideas that emerge as a result of both imagination and 
thinking have potencies much like actual real-life things. As discussed earlier, 
deliberative imagination constructs the image upon which the thinking faculty reflects.  
Again, for example, an image of a growling tiger and the thoughts that emerge as a 
result of thinking about the image of a growling tiger are almost as powerful as a real-
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life growling tiger.  As Aristotle puts it, this is why we shudder and are frightened—
even when we are merely thinking of menacing things. This means that the 
combination of images of X (which may include deliberative imagination-induced 
foreboding evil images) and thoughts about images of X can produce a rather similar 
kind of fear that emerges from observing real-life fearful things.  The major difference 
is that of degree; in real-life one is likely to be panic-stricken at the sight of a growling 
tiger at arms distance, but less likely so when observing such an event unfold on stage 
in the confines of an amphitheater.   
 
Moreover, since a tragedy is “more alive” than a picture or any other 
inanimate art object—we are actually observing our fellow citizens engage in a range 
of activities on stage—it is reasonable to think that the emotional response of actually 
observing Oedipus’ travails is very close to the emotional response that would be 
produced if one observed someone in real life undergoing similar struggles (caused by 
error) to that of Oedipus.  Aristotle, in fact, notes that such unfixable error-induced 
effects are to be most feared and pitied: 
 
And all fearful things are more fearful, in so far as, if after an error 
[ἁμάρτωσιν] occurs, it is not possible to be corrected…and thus in a word, [all] 
things are fearful, inasmuch  as, when they occur in a certain manner or when 
they are about to occur, they are pitiable [ἐλεεινά ἐστιν].72 
 
Along with pity, Aristotle goes on to address the cognitive effects that are 
produced and with respect to whom tragedy should befall: 
 
Fear produces deliberation [βουλευτικούς], and indeed no one deliberates 
about that which is without hope.  Consequently, whenever it is fitting that 
the audience should be afraid [that something may happen] to them, it is 
necessary to prepare [the audience] for  such kinds of [fearful scenarios]; 
especially that it is possible that they will suffer such kinds [of fearful 
scenarios]; certainly that others have suffered greater [than they have]; and 
[they] are shown that those who are similar [to them] are suffering or have 
suffered, and have suffered at the hands of those from whom they did not 
expect; and both in such ways and at those times that they did not suspect.73 
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We not only fear what we think is about to happen to Oedipus as result of his 
honest mistakes, but we are also afraid upon reflecting how similar events could befall 
us.  Thus, the cognitive stimulation, in conjunction with the images produced by 
deliberative imagination, brings to fruition a range of intensity with respect to the 
emotion of fear (reasonably, this would apply to pity as well).  The upshot is that the 
emotion of fear (and pity) is imbued with cognition.  Finally, Aristotle brings together 
the relationship of pity and suffering coupled with the relevant cognitive responses.   
He tells us: 
 
[And pity is also produced by] both signs and actions [related to suffering], for 
instance both the clothes of those who have painfully worked hard and as 
many such kinds of things, and words and all the rest of the [details] of those 
who are in a state of suffering, for instance those who are presently dying.  
And especially the morally excellent men [σπουδαίους], who are in such critical 
scenarios, are those who are pitiable; for all these things, on account of 
appearing near, produce greater pity, and both because they are undeserving of evil and 
because the suffering is apparent to our eyes.74   
 
Keeping in mind the discussion of fear above, Aristotle brings together the 
intensity of pity by way of the confluence of events that illuminate suffering.  The 
audience is brought to such a state of pity in the case of Oedipus in the light of his 
honest mistake, the undeserving events that follow, the self-inflicted wounds to his 
eyes, the blood on the clothing as a result of these wounds, Oedipus’ own verbal and 
physical expressions of pain, etc.  All of this comes together on stage to produce pity 
in the audience at a very intense level.  Most notably, Aristotle points out that the 
cognitive dimension of pity is produced by understanding that the evil that befalls 
someone, like Oedipus, is undeserving, while the emotional aspect of pity is tethered 
to the immediacy and close distance of observing someone, like Oedipus, suffer. 
Thus, much like fear, pity is also imbued with cognition.  Therefore, both pity and 
fear, according to Aristotle, are emotions that have a cognitive dimension.  
 
Finally, unlike an actual legal trial, the judging audience can take pleasure in 
what has occurred to them.  With the cognitive dimensions of pity and fear in place, 
the audience can both judge Oedipus and determine of what he is morally and legally 
culpable and take pleasure in the quality of such judgments.  Indeed, given the role of 
σύνεσις and γνώμη, ϕαντασιά, and pity and fear, it is quite plausible to understand the 
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pleasure associated with Aristotle’s concept of catharsis in a highly cognitive way.  It is 
this cognitive pleasure, I argue, that captures the tragic pleasure of Aristotle’s concept 
of catharsis.      
 
VII.   Conclusion 
 
By indicating the division that exists between the citizens and all others in the 
polis, it is possible to explicate the corresponding kinds of catharsis and tragic pleasure 
that are produced.  Character analysis is a highly cognitive process both in everyday 
interactions with others as well as in observing a tragic play for the Athenian citizen.  
The positive account offered has revealed the plausibility of a richly cognitive 
interpretation of catharsis that stands in sharp contrast to Lear’s anti-cognitivist 
interpretation.  Specifically, the cathartic experience is closely linked to the evaluative 
judgments and rational imagination of an educated citizenry.  While observing the 
deeds of the protagonist, the ensuing emotions of pity and fear are cognitively imbued 
and heightened by understanding that the framework of his predicament is, mutatis 
mutandis, not all that different than one that could befall most people.  Additionally, as 
part of this experience, there is the production of tragic pleasure; namely, the joy in 
having judged the overall character of the protagonist correctly in the light of his 
overall circumstances.  This interpretation, then, establishes a highly cognitive account 
of the cathartic experience and tragic pleasure.  Indeed, it is just such an account that 
provides the kind of response by Aristotle that would be needed to address adequately 
Plato’s challenge.75  
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